Abstract. Several approaches have been proposed for privacy preserving data publication. In this paper we consider the important case in which a certain view over a dynamic dataset has to be released a number of times during its history. The insufficiency of techniques used for one-shot publication in the case of subsequent releases has been previously recognized, and some new approaches have been proposed. Our research shows that relevant privacy threats, not recognized by previous proposals, can occur in practice. In particular, we show the cascading effects that a single (or a few) compromised tuples can have in data re-publication when coupled with the ability of an adversary to recognize historical correlations among released tuples. A theoretical study of the threats leads us to a defense algorithm, implemented as a significant extension of the m-invariance technique. Extensive experiments using publicly available datasets show that the proposed technique preserves the utility of published data and effectively protects from the identified privacy threats.
Introduction
There are many data repositories that store time-dependent data and that require recurrent release of recently acquired data to third parties. Many papers have addressed the problem of anonymizing datasets for one-time publication ( [1] [2] [3] [4] among many others). The main defense technique consists in providing anonymity by generalizing the values of quasi-identifier (QI) attributes, so that each released tuple belongs to a group (called QI-group) having the same value for the QI attributes. This intuitively guarantees that within a group the tuple respondents cannot be distinguished. The cardinality of the group as well as the distribution of sensitive attribute values in each group are relevant parameters for the achieved anonymity. However, less attention has been given to privacy threats that can occur upon re-publication of the same database after updates have been performed. Indeed, it has been recognized that additional privacy issues arise if the adversary obtains a history of tables anonymized as described above. For example, by understanding that tuples t 1 and t 2 in different releases refer to the same (anonymous) individual, the intersection of the candidate respondents for t 1 and t 2 can lead to a privacy violation. As a motivating example, we consider data about patients and their cause of hospitalization (called disease for simplicity in the rest of this paper) frequently released by a hospital to certain institutions for data analysis. Each released table contains one tuple for each patient hospitalized during the last L months. In this scenario, certain tuples may be present in multiple releases, some tuples that never appeared before can appear in new releases, and other tuples may disappear in subsequent releases. Hence, we consider updates involving both insertion and removal of tuples. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that when a tuple appears in multiple releases, the corresponding private value remains the same. 1 We consider the realistic case that some tuples may be compromised; for example, the actual disease of some patient may be known to the adversary (note that, at least, every patient is aware of her own disease). The following examples illustrate privacy threats that can occur in such a scenario. Example 1. Consider the original microdata at time τ1 and τ2, shown in Tables 1(a) and 1(c), and the generalized microdata in Tables 1(b) and 1(d) . Note that each generalization guarantees anonymity according to state-of-the-art techniques (k-anonymity [1] with k = 3, l-diversity [3] with l = 3, and t-closeness [4] with t = 0); moreover the generalization at time τ2 also satisfies m-invariance [5] with m = 3, a technique specifically designed for data re-publication.
The respondents of tuples belonging to QI-group 3 in Table 1 (d) are Doris, Fiona and Carl, and the set of their candidate private values is {cancer, bronchitis, AIDS}. Suppose that the tuple about Carl has been compromised, hence revealing to the adversary that Carl has AIDS. This leads the adversary to derive by exclusion that either Doris was hospitalized for cancer and Fiona for bronchitis, or vice versa. Now, note that two new tuples have been inserted at τ2, namely those regarding Grace and Hanna, while the tuples regarding Alice and Betty have been removed. In order to understand what we mean by historical correlation, consider the histories of QI-groups of Doris' and Fiona's tuples, i.e., QI-group 2 in Table 1 (b) and QI-group 3 in Table 1 (d). The set of respondents of the first group is {Doris, Erica,Fiona} while for the second is {Carl, Doris, Fiona}, and the corresponding set of private values is {cancer, bronchitis, AIDS} for both. By assumption, the presence in both releases of tuples for Doris and Fiona imply that each of them preserved her private value across releases. Hence, the possible private values for Doris and Fiona, considering that Carl's tuple has been compromised, were {cancer, bronchitis} even at τ1. Since at τ1 the possible private values for the QI-group 2 (including a tuple whose respondent must be Erica) were {cancer, bronchitis, AIDS}, the adversary can conclude that Erica was hospitalized for AIDS.
One of the first attempts to address privacy issues in data re-publication can be found in [6] . That work proposes a technique to preserve a weak form of l-diversity when multiple versions of the same table are released over time and the table is updated by insertions only. One shortcoming of that technique is that microdata publishing is postponed until the conditions for guaranteeing the required level of l-diversity are met. A similar scenario is addressed in [7] and in [8] in the case in which tuples are released together with their unique identifier or not, respectively. Even if the solutions proposed in those works do not require delaying data publication, they are restricted to the case in which tables are updated with insertions only, and cannot be applied when tuples are removed. The first work to address privacy-preserving data re-publication when both insertions and deletions are allowed is [5] , in which the m-invariance property is proposed. That property ensures that i) all the QI-groups in which a tuple appears have the same set of private values (the cardinality of such set must be greater than or equal to m), and ii) the set of private values of QI-groups maximize the level of diversity (i.e., each QI-group does not contain tuples having the same private value). However, m-invariance is prone to privacy threats (as the ones exemplified above) that were not identified before, for which we propose both a theoretical study and a defense algorithm.
In this paper we consider the same scenario considered in [5] , admitting both insertion and removal of tuples, but also considering the case that some tuples may be compromised. We show that, even when a very small percentage of tuples is compromised, the correlation that can be identified between tuples in different releases can lead to serious privacy leaks.
The main contributions of our work are the following: a) We perform a probabilistic analysis showing that in realistic cases the application of state-of-the-art techniques for privacy preservation in data re-publication can fail to protect the privacy of individuals. b) We propose the Cor-Split algorithm as a defense technique, inspired by m-invariance, against attacks exploiting compromised tuples and historical correlations. The algorithm is proved to correctly provide protection. c) We show experimental results on public data directly comparing Cor-Split with m-invariance: From the experiments we can conclude that the extra protection offered by our algorithm has negligible costs over previously known techniques.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the privacy threat we are considering. Section 3 reports a probabilistic analysis showing the actual risk of a privacy breach according to the value of some parameters. Section 4 illustrates the Cor-Split defense algorithm and its formal properties. Section 5 shows experimental results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model of privacy threats
In this section we formally model the notions of privacy breach, and the functions that may be used by an adversary to restrict the set of private values associated to each candidate tuple respondent. We call such functions private value restriction functions.
Preliminary definitions
In this paper we denote by T j an original table at time τ j , and by T * j the generalization of T j released by the data publisher; we denote by H *
a history of released generalized tables. We say that a tuple t has lifespan L if the generalization t * of t appeared in each table T * i with i ∈ L; we denote by t.r the respondent of t.
Tables are generalized by a generalization function G : T × H × R × Θ → T * , where T is the set of possible original tables, H is the set of possible histories of original microdata tables, R is the collection of possible sets of tuples respondents, Θ is the set of functions that map each respondent r to her set of possible private values S r , and T * is the set of possible generalized tables. We denote by S r,j the set of possible private values of respondent r at time τ j .
We assume that the schema of tables in H * 1,j remains unchanged throughout the release history, and we classify the table columns into a set A qi of quasiidentifier attributes (for the sake of simplicity we assume that categorical values are transformed in numeric ones), and into a single private attribute A s having domain S; t[A] is the projection of t onto A. Columns that do not act as either quasi-identifier or private value are irrelevant with respect to privacy preservation and therefore they are ignored in the rest of the paper. Tuples in T * are partitioned into QI-groups; i.e., sets of tuples having the same values for their quasi-identifier attributes. We denote by Q.R the set of respondents of tuples belonging to a QI-group Q. The signature Q.sig of Q is the set of private values of tuples belonging to Q.
We assume that the background knowledge available to an adversary is composed of the generalization function G, and the set R of respondents, as well as their QI values and their sets of possible private values. Moreover, as usual in related work, we assume that, given a QI-group Q, an adversary may get to know the exact set of respondents of tuples in Q. Note that the latter is a conservative assumption, since in general the generalized QI values of tuples in Q could match more users than the actual respondents of Q's tuples.
Definition 1 (privacy breach).
A privacy breach occurs when an adversary knows the sensitive association between a user and one or more of her private values.
Threats deriving from compromised tuples
As shown by Example 1, the presence of a compromised tuple in a QI-group Q can be used by an adversary to restrict the set of possible private values of the respondents of other tuples in Q. This kind of adversarial inference can be modeled as a compromised tuples-based private value restriction (ct-pvr) function.
Definition 2 (ct-pvr function). Given a history of released tables H * 1,j , the respondent r of a tuple t * in H * 1,j , r having prior set of possible private values S r , the set H * 1,j (Q, t) of QI-groups published in H * 1,j and containing a generalization of t, and a set C H * 1,j of compromised tuples published in H * 1,j , a ct-pvr function is a function ct-pvr :
Note that in order to discard a value for a respondent of a tuple belonging to Q, every tuple in Q having that value should be associated by the adversary to a different respondent. The example below shows how the case of a compromised tuple reported in Example 1 applies to Definition 2. of compromised tuples known by the adversary includes the first tuple in Table 1(d) . Hence, by applying the ct-pvr function considering the QI-group 1, the adversary can discard the value a=AIDS from Sr, since AIDS is known to be the private value of Carl's tuple. Consequently, after the application of the ct-pvr function the set of Doris' possible private values contain only cancer and bronchitis. The same reasoning can be applied with r=Fiona.
Threats deriving from re-published microdata
As shown in Example 1, re-published microdata is prone to a specific class of adversarial inference. In order to model this kind of privacy threats we introduce the notion of historical correlation.
Definition 3 (historical correlation)
. Given a history of released tables H * 1,j , and two QI-groups Q 1 ⊆ T * i ∈ H * 1,j and Q 2 ⊆ T * l ∈ H * 1,j (i = l), a historical correlation between two sets of respondents R 1 and R 2 can be recognized if there exist two QI-groups Q 1 and Q 2 (Q 1 = Q 2 and Q 1 .S = Q 2 .S, where Q 1 .S and Q 2 .S are the multisets composed of private values of tuples in Q 1 and in Q 2 , respectively) such that all the following conditions hold:
where Q 1 .R and Q 2 .R are the sets of respondents of tuples belonging to Q 1 and Q 2 , respectively.
Theorem 1 (historical correlations).
If two sets of respondents R 1 and R 2 are in a historical correlation, then the multiset composed of the private values of respondents in R 1 is equal to the multiset composed of the private values of respondents in R 2 .
As it was shown in Example 1, historical correlations can be used to narrow the set of candidate private values of a respondent, possibly leading to the exact derivation of her private value. Such correlations are called historical since they rely on the presence of the same sets of tuples in multiple views belonging to a history of releases. For instance, in Example 1 an adversary was able to find a historical correlation between R 1 ={Carl} and R 2 ={Erica} by observing QIgroup 2 and QI-group 3, released at time τ 1 and τ 2 , respectively: c1) (QI-group 3).R ⊃ {Carl} c2) (QI-group 2).R ⊃ {Erica} c3) (QI-group 3).R \ {Carl} = (QI-group 2).R \ {Erica} Similarly, a historical correlation between {Alice, Betty} and {Doris, Fiona} could be discovered observing QI-group 1 and QI-group 3.
Example 3. Consider Figure 1 , which depicts two QI-groups Q1 = {t * 1 , t * 2 , t * 3 , t * 4 } and Q2 = {t * 1 , t * 2 , t * 5 , t * 6 }, and the sets of respondent of Q1 and Q2, which are Q1.R = {r1, r2, r3, r4} and Q2.R = {r1, r2, r5, r6}, respectively. In this situation a historical correlation between R1 = {r3, r4} and R2 = {r5, r6} can be recognized. Indeed, the set of respondents {r1, r2} (enclosed in a solid ellipse) appears in both Q1.R and Q2.R and, since the private value of each tuple cannot change, the private values of r1 and r2 are the same in Q1 and in Q2. As a consequence, the set of private values of {r3, r4} is the same as that of {r5, r6} (the sets of tuples related by a historical correlation are enclosed in a dashed ellipse).
The adversarial inference that exploits historical correlations to the aim of restricting the set of possible private values of a tuple respondent can be modeled according to the following historical correlation-based private value restriction (hc-pvr) function.
Definition 4 (hc-pvr function). Given a history of released tables H * 1,j , the respondent r of a tuple t * in H * 1,j , r having initial set of possible private values S r , and the set R(H * 1,j , r) of sets of respondents that are linked to r by a historical correlation in H * 1,j , a hc-pvr function is a function hc-pvr :
hc-pvr(r, S r , R(H * 1,j , r)) = S r \ {a ∈ S | ∃ R ∈ R(H * 1,j , r), ∀r ∈ R, a / ∈ S r ,j }.
The following example shows how the adversarial inference presented in Example 1 applies to Definition 4. , Erica) includes the set {Carl} (i.e., a historical correlation relating Erica and Carl was discovered). The set of Carl's possible private values includes neither cancer nor bronchitis (i.e., the adversary knows that the private value of his tuple is AIDS ). Hence, hc-pvr(Erica, SErica, R(H * 1,2 , Erica)) = = {cancer, AIDS, bronchitis} \ {cancer, bronchitis} = {AIDS}.
Then, after the second release the adversary derives that the set of possible private values of Erica is {AIDS}. As a consequence, the sensitive association between Erica and AIDS is discovered.
Probabilistic analysis
The actual risk of a privacy breach due to the threats we are considering depends on several parameters. In this section we perform a probabilistic analysis of this risk, assuming that each tuple has probability p of being compromised. Without loss of generality, we also assume that released microdata satisfy the m-invariance principle, since -as it will be shown later in this section -this is a worst case for our probabilistic analysis. As a consequence, we also assume that the set S of private values includes at least as many values as the enforced level m of m-invariance. We also assume that each tuple is released at most L times; i.e., for each tuple t, L is an upper limit for the cardinality of its lifespan L. The probability of privacy breach is measured, depending on the parameters p, m, L as well as others, as the result of the application of the private value restriction functions described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Probability of excluding private values due to compromised tuples
As illustrated in Section 2.2, given a QI-group Q, if all the tuples in Q having private value a are compromised, then an adversary can conclude that no other respondent of tuples in Q has private value a. Of course, the probability that such an event occurs decreases the higher is the number of occurrences of tuples ) is:
where p is the probability of a generic tuple to be compromised.
The plot shown in Figure 2(a) shows the value of p ct (H * 1,j , t) with respect to the number of releases containing the tuple (here we assume that the lifespan of t covers the entire history) for different values of p. As expected, p ct (H
Probability of excluding private values due to historical correlation
The probability that a private value is excluded from the set of candidate private values due to historical correlations is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given a history of released tables H *
where n = min
{|R|} is the minimum cardinality of sets of respondents in R(H * 1,j , r), and p is the probability of a generic tuple to be compromised.
The plot shown in Figure 2 (b) shows the value of p hc (H * 1,j , t) with respect to the length j of the release history (assuming the lifespan of t covers the entire history) and to the minimum cardinality n of sets of respondents involved in historical correlations. The released tables are assumed to satisfy the m-invariance property with m = 6, and the probability of a tuple to be compromised is set to p = 0.04. As expected, p hc (H * 1,j , t) grows with the length of the release history of the tuple and it is higher for smaller values of n.
Probability of privacy breach due to combined threats
After having separately considered the threats deriving from functions ct-pvr and hc-pvr we can quantify the probability of privacy breach deriving from the application of both functions.
Theorem 2 (probability of privacy breach). Given a history of released tables H *
{|R|} is the minimum cardinality of sets of respondents in R(H * 1,j , r), and p is the probability of a generic tuple to be compromised, then the probability that a privacy breach is determined by functions ct-pvr and hc-pvr at time j is:
The plot shown in Figure 2 (c) shows the value of p pb (H * 1,j , t) with respect to the length j of the release history (assuming the lifespan of t covers the entire history) and to the minimum cardinality n of sets of respondents involved in historical correlations. The released tables are assumed to satisfy the m-invariance property with m = 6, and the probability of a tuple to be compromised is set to p = 0.04. It can be observed that the probability of privacy breach is very high with n = 1. The value of p pb is lower than 0.15 with n = 2; with n = 3 the probability of privacy breach is lower than 0.1.
Defense

Safety against private value restriction functions
In order to defend re-published microdata against private value restriction functions based on compromised tuples and historical correlations, our technique consists in enforcing a generalization principle -which we name (m, n)-historical safety -with parameters that guarantee that the probability of privacy breach is below a certain threshold h. Before defining (m, n)-historical safety it is necessary to introduce a novel principle, which we name weak m-invariance. As it will we shown in Section 4.2, this principle can be applied to avoid the disclosure of historical correlations while minimizing the number of counterfeits. 
Weak m-invariance is a weaker version of the m-invariance principle. Indeed, while m-invariance requires that all the tuples in a QI-group have different private values, according to weak m-invariance QI-groups can contain tuples with duplicate private values, provided that their multiplicity is the same. Hence, it is easy to verify that m-invariance is a particular case of weak m-invariance in which the multiplicity of tuples having a given private value in a given QIgroup is always 1. With respect to privacy preservation, it can be observed that weak m-invariance provides the same level of diversity as the one provided by m-invariance. On the other hand, the obvious shortcoming of having multiplicities of private values greater than 1 in a QI-group is that in most cases the degree of generalization of QI values of that QI-group would grow with the multiplicity. Hence, as it will be shown in Section 4.2, an objective of our devised generalization algorithm is to minimize the multiplicity of private values in QI-groups.
Definition 7 (hc-safety). Given a history of released tables H * 1,j and a QIgroup Q ⊆ T * i ∈ H * 1,j , Q is hc-safe with degree n if either: i) no set of respondents is related with the respondents of tuples in Q by a historical correlation in H * 1,j , or ii) the cardinality of each set of respondents that is related with the respondents of tuples in Q by a historical correlation in H * 1,j is greater than or equal to n.
Definition 8 ((m, n)-historical safety). Given m, n ∈ N, n ≤ m, a generalization function G is (m, n)-historically safe if, for each table T j+1 , for each history of released tables H * 1,j satisfying weak m-invariance, and
(R is the of tuples respondents, and ϑ is the function that maps each respondent in R into her set of possible private values), the following conditions hold:
is hc-safe with degree n with respect to H * 1,j , T * j+1 .
The above definition states that, in order to be (m, n)-historically safe, a generalization function must i) preserve weak m-invariance and ii) generate QIgroups such that the cardinality of sets involved in historical correlations that can be derived from them is greater than or equal to n. Condition i) is imposed to protect against the attacks identified in [5] ; condition ii) is imposed to protect against historical correlations.
In order to guarantee that the probability of privacy breach for a tuple t is below a certain threshold h it is necessary to have an estimate of the probability p of released tuples to be compromised, and to determine the maximum cardinality L of its lifespan (i.e., the maximum number of times that t can be republished). Note that L is an upper bound for the cardinality of L H * 1,j shown in the definitions of private value restriction functions (see Section 3). In general, the values of p and L depend on the domain of the data. For instance, a hospital releasing microdata about patients and diseases may estimate that an adversary may get to know the sensitive association about no more than 4% of its patients (hence, p = 0.04), and it can decide to republish each tuple at most 24 times (hence, L = 24). Once values for p and L have been determined it is possible to express the concept of safety of a generalization function against a threshold h. n that guarantees that the probability of privacy breach is below h. Since we assume that those parameters do not change during the release history, the parameter n is chosen before the generalization of the first table, and it remains unchanged throughout the release history. The algorithm for choosing n is shown in Figure 3 . Note that for certain values of p, L, m, and for a required threshold h, the probability of privacy breach could be higher than h for every possible value of n. In this case, microdata would not be released unless the value of parameters L or m are changed. In the other case, microdata are generalized using the value of n determined by the algorithm in Figure 3 . Our devised generalization algorithm, shown in Figure 4 , is a significant modification of the algorithm for m-invariant generalization proposed in [5] . Note that the algorithm in [5] , though enforcing weak m-invariance, does not provide guarantees about the cardinality of sets of respondents involved in historical correlations. Moreover, our empirical study (reported in Section 5) shows that QI-groups generated by that algorithm may allow an adversary to derive several historical correlations between small sets of respondents, determining severe privacy threats.
Overview of our generalization algorithm. Given the original table T j+1 at time τ j+1 , the history H * 1,j of generalized tables published before τ j+1 , the set R of respondents, and function ϑ, the output of our generalization algorithm is the generalized table T * j+1 . Our algorithm can be roughly divided into 4 phases. While the first 3 phases are essentially identical to the ones of the algorithm in [5] , Phase 4 is different, since in that phase (m, n)-historical safety is enforced. Adopting the notation of [5] we call S ∩ the set of tuples in T j+1 that have been released before τ j+1 , and S -the remaining tuples in T j .
-Phase 1: Division. This phase consists in partitioning the set of tuples in S ∩ into buckets. Each bucket is uniquely identified by a signature among the ones of tuples in S ∩ , and it contains only tuples that appeared in H * 1,j in QI-groups having the same signature of the bucket. -Phase 2: Balancing. The balancing phase is applied in turn to each bucket.
Its goal is to guarantee that every private value of the bucket's signature is represented by the same number of tuples in the bucket. Buckets are balanced by inserting tuples belonging to S -as long as this is possible; if no other tuples in S -can be used to balance the bucket, counterfeit tuples are inserted. -Phase 3: Assignment. In this phase, the remaining tuples in S -are assigned to the existing buckets as long as they remain balanced. If no other tuple can be assigned to the existing buckets without violating balancing, new buckets are created, and the remaining tuples are assigned to the new buckets such that the new buckets are balanced. The cardinality of the signature of new buckets is greater than or equal to m. -Phase 4: Cor-Partition This phase is applied in turn to each bucket. In this phase, buckets are partitioned into weak m-invariant QI-groups such that, if a novel historical correlation can be identified by matching the new QI-groups with those released during H * 1,j , then the cardinality of the sets of respondents involved in it is greater than or equal to n; i.e., QI-groups are hc-safe with degree n. For brevity, when the degree n of hc-safety is clear, we say that a QI-group is hc-safe (or hc-unsafe), omitting the degree of hc-safety. This phase is described in detail in the following of this section.
Cor-Partition. The algorithm pseudo-code is illustrated in Figure 5 . Consider a generic bucket B composed of s · l tuples (s ≥ m), where s is the cardinality of the signature of B (named B.sig), and l ≥ 1. After an initialization phase (line 1), the algorithm creates, for each QI attribute in A qi , a list of the tuples in B partially ordered according to their value for that attribute (line 2). We denote L i the list regarding attribute A qi i , and L the set of such lists. Then, a cycle is repeated until every tuple in B is assigned to a QI-group (lines 3 to 20).
At first, each list is traversed in turn to obtain a weak m-invariant QI-group Q i (lines 6 to 8) by selecting, for each private value belonging to the signature of for all Li ∈ L do 6: repeat 7:
QI-group Qi := createQIG(Li, Di, B.sig) 8:
until hcSafe(Qi, n, j) ∨ (|Qi| < |B.sig|) 9:
if |Qi| < |B.sig| then: Qi := createQIG(Li, ∅, B.sig); Q the bucket, the first tuple in L i having that value, temporarily discarding those tuples L i that would determine hc-unsafe QI-groups. Temporarily discarded tuples are randomly chosen from tuples in Q i and replaced with other tuples in B having the same private value, as long as either the resulting QI-group is hc-safe, or no more tuples are available from B. In the latter case (lines 9 to 12), an hc-unsafe QI-group Q (temp) i is created, and it is merged with a growing number of QI-groups previously created from the same bucket, until either the resulting QI-group is hc-safe, or no other available QI-group remains. In the latter case (line 13), Q (temp) i is transformed by substituting a growing number of tuples in it with counterfeits, until the resulting QI-group Q i is hc-safe. Note that counterfeit tuples are inserted only in the case in which no other operation is possible to generate a hc-safe QI-group.
Hence, after line 14, for each QI attribute in A qi a hc-safe QI-group is available. For each of these QI-groups we call semiperimeter the sum of the normalized lengths of the interval of each QI value of tuples in it. Obviously, smaller semiperimeters correspond to finer-grained generalization. For this reason, the QI-group Q j having the smallest semiperimeter is chosen (line 15). Then (lines 16 to 18), tuples in Q j are removed from B, as well as from the lists in L, and are added to T * j+1 , after having possibly removed duplicate tuples (indeed, in line 11, Q j could have been merged with QI-groups already inserted into T * j+1 ).
Input: parameters Q, n, j obtained from the Cor-Split algorithm. Output: true if Q is hc-safe with degree n; false otherwise.
1: for int i := 0 to j do 2: multiset (C, ω) := multiset(∅, ω) 3:
for all generalized tuple t * ∈ Q do 4:
respondent r := t * .r 5:
original tuple t := r.t 6:
QI-group Q := t.QI(i) 7:
if Q = null then 8:
C := C ∪ Q .id 9:
end if 10:
end for 11:
l := max c∈C (ω(c))
12:
if |Q| − n < l < |Q| then 13:
return false 14:
end if 15: end for 16: return true Checking hc-safety. The algorithm for checking the hc-safety of a QI-group to be released in T * j+1 is illustrated in Figure 6 . Given a release history H * 1,j , a QI-group Q and a degree n ∈ N, it follows from Definition 3 that in order to check whether Q is hc-unsafe it is sufficient to check whether it exists a set of l respondents whose tuples belonged to the same QI-group both in release T * j and T * i ∈ H * 1,j , with l smaller than |Q| and greater than |Q|−n. Hence (lines 2 to 10), for each release T * i ∈ H * 1,j the algorithm creates a multiset that contains, for each respondent r of tuples in Q, the unique identifier of the QI-group that included r's tuple in release T * i (if it exists). Then (line 11), the maximum multiplicity l of the elements of the multiset is calculated; i.e., l is the maximum number of respondents of tuples in Q whose tuples also belonged to the same QI-group in T * i . If it exists at least one release T * i such that the value l is smaller than |Q| and greater than |Q| − n the algorithm determines that Q is hc-unsafe with respect to the degree n; otherwise Q is hc-safe with degree n.
pvr-safety. The following lemma states a sufficient condition to ensure that a generalization function is pvr-safe. The soundness of the Cor-Split algorithm is proved by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (pvr-safety of the Cor-Split algorithm). The Cor-Split algorithm computes a pvr-safe generalization function.
Experimental evaluation
Experiments were performed using a real census dataset published by the Minnesota Population Center and available at http://ipums.org/. The dataset is composed of 600, 000 tuples. Each tuple stores information about an individual; it includes 4 QI-attributes (age, birthplace, education, gender) and one private attribute income having 50 possible values, each one representing an income range. In order to evaluate our technique with respect to different scenarios, we simulated insertions and deletions from the dataset at different rates. Hence, we started with a table T 1 including 200, 000 (resp. 60, 000) tuples, and we obtained a table T 2 by randomly deleting 10% (resp. 33%) of T 1 's tuples and inserting the same number of tuples randomly chosen from unpublished tuples. The same procedure was repeated with the subsequent tables to obtain a history having length 21 (resp. 24). In these experiments we assumed that the probability of a tuple to be compromised is p = 0.04, the enforced level of (weak) m-invariance is m = 6, the maximum length of the release history of each tuple is L = 21 (resp. L = 24), and the safety threshold is h = 0.1. Given these parameters, the level n of (m, n)-historical safety to be enforced is n = 3. Results of experiments with different values for parameters m and n (m = 4 ÷ 10, n = 1 ÷ 5) are not reported here for lack of space; however, they essentially lead to the same conclusions as the ones reported below.
Historical correlations determined by m-invariance. The first set of experiments aimed at evaluating the threat determined by private value restriction In particular, we adopted the algorithm in [5] to generalize microdata tables, and at any release we counted the number of released QI-groups that were hc-unsafe with respect to the degree n = 3; hc-unsafe QI-groups were recognized using the algorithm reported in Figure 6 . Results in the considered scenarios are illustrated in Figure 7 , and show that many released QI-groups may allow an adversary to derive historical correlations between small sets of respondents (having cardinality 1 or 2), determining relevant privacy threats.
Counterfeits and query error. The second set of experiments was performed on microdata generalized by a Java implementation of the Cor-Split algorithm. Tuples were generalized in order to enforce (m, n)-historical safety with m = 6 and n = 3. At first, we measured the number of counterfeit tuples introduced by Cor-Split. Results are illustrated in Figure 8 and show that in both scenarios the algorithm introduced a few counterfeits. Then, we compared the utility of microdata generalized by Cor-Split and by the algorithm for m-invariance in terms of the precision in answering aggregate queries (e.g., count the number of individuals in the table whose QI-values belong to certain ranges). Queries were randomly generated according to different values of expected selectivity, i.e., expected ratio of tuples to be returned by the query. For each value of expected selectivity, 10, 000 queries were randomly generated. The imprecision in query answering was calculated in terms of the median error of query answers. The results reported in Figure 9 show that the accuracy of query answering obtained by Cor-Split is very close the to one observed with the use of the generalization algorithm for m-invariance, with the advantage of protecting from the threats we have identified.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have addressed privacy threats that may arise when a certain view over a dynamic dataset has to be released multiple times during its history.
We have shown the limits of existing techniques to protect privacy in the case an adversary is able to recognize correlations between sets of tuples released in different views and even a small percentage of tuples is compromised. After having formalized the problem, we have provided a probabilistic study of the identified threats, and we have proposed a sound defense algorithm that has been experimentally validated. Future work includes the study of other attacks based on correlation between different releases. In particular, we are currently investigating the case in which tuples for the same respondent in different releases can have different private values; in this scenario our defense can still be effective against the attacks considered in this paper, but the adversary may exploit a different kind of historical correlation, based on private values associated to candidate respondents in a history of released tuples.
